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This essay treats of the relationship between quantum and
classical mechanics. Both physicists and philosophers hold that
quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics as �� 0, or that
classical mechanics is a special case of quantum mechanics in this
limit. If one theory reduces to another, certain formal and nonformal
conditions must be satisfied. These conditions are formulated and it
is shown that the Wigner transformation can serve as a natural
reduction function in a reduction which satisfies the formal and non­
formal conditions. Finally, it is argued that this reduction does not
aid in solving the problem of providing an adequate metaphysical
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A question of particular interest for the philosophy of physics
is in what sense, if any, is classical mechanics a limiting case of
quantum mechanics. A more general philosophical question also arises:
What does it mean to say that one theory is a limiting case of another?
Neither question is easy to answer. The present study attempts to
formulate a rigorous answer to the first question in the hope that it
will generate some insight into the methodological issues surrounding
the second, more general question.
With respect to the relation between classical mechanics and
quantum mechanics, physicists assume one of two positions. Most
physicists believe that classical mechanics is a limiting case of
quantum mechanics in the sense that classical mechanics can be derived
from quantum mechanics in the limit � + O. For example, Gottfried
writes: " ••• from a satisfactory quantum theory one must be able to
deduce classical mechanics and electrodynamics by taking an appropriate
limit" (Gottfried 1966:6). Call this the orthodox view. A second,
minority view is that classical mechanics is not a limiting case of
quantum theory. Bohr maintains that classical theory is logically
prior to quantum theory and that while a formal analogy obtains between
the two theories, there is no stronger relation between them (Bohr 1949).
David Bohm also subscribes to the view that quantum theory logically
presupposes classical theory. Furthermore, Bohm believes that the con­
cepts of classical theory are generally valid and that the concepts of
quantum theory are special cases of their classical analogues. In
contrast to the orthodox position, the minority stance is that it is not
possible to "deduce classical concepts as limiting cases of quantum
concepts" (Bohm 1951:625).
There are difficulties with holding either the orthodox or the
minority view. The orthodox view appears to imply that there is a we11-
defined, mathematical limit as h + 0 whereby, given quantum theory,
classical physics can be recovered. However, arguments in support of
the orthodox view do not justify the existence of such a limit. The
arguments in the literature are usually based on formal analogies
2
between the two theories or on a cor£espondence between the central
concepts of quantum theory and those of classical theory. For
example, quantum equations of motion can be written in terms of the
commutator bracket of two dynamical variables and classical equations
can be written in terms of the Poisson bracket of dynamical variables.
Such formal analogies are instructive, but the existence of such
analogies does not imply the existence of a conceptual relation between
the theories, which would allow one to claim that classical mechanics
is a limiting case or special case of quantum mechanics. There are
far-reaching analogies between hydrodynamics and the theory of heat,
yet one cannot maintain that hydrodynamics can be derived from the
theory of heat. Hence, a proponent of the orthodox view is obliged to
show that the relation between classical and quantum theory goes beyond
that of formal analogy.
Difficulties with the minority view are of a different kind.
The minority view has undersirable metaphysical and methodological
consequences. On the minority view, classical mechanics is the correct
universal theory with quantum mechanics appearing as an appendage which
serves to generate predictions for micro-phenomena. However, quantum
theory does appear to offer a complete account of the structure of
matter in terms of its atomic and subatomic constituents. Quantum
theory seems to be our best candidate for a universal theory of matter.
Hence, one would expect that classical mechanics, valid for macroscopic
objects, should be accounted for in terms of quantum theory, the best
theory of micro-phenomena. The minority view denies the possibility of
so accounting for the success of classical theory. This denial violates
our metaphysical intuitions because we do believe that adequate
explanations of macro-phenomena can be given by examining the behavior
of their micro-constituents.
A rigorous answer to the first question raised above would serve
to settle the issue between the orthodox and the minority views.
Analogous positions can be delineated with respect to the more
general methodological question. The issue of whether one theory is a
limiting case of another arises in the context of intertheoretic
reduction. An approximation or limiting case is a kind of reductive
relation that might hold between two theories.
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Here it is necessary to clarify a terminological problem. Both
physicists and philosophers believe that under certain circumstances
one theory reduces to another, but they use the term differently. In
philosophical parlance, the less fundamental theory is said to reduce
to the more fundamental theory. A philosopher would say that thermo­
dynamics reduces to statistical mechanics. For the physicist, reduction
is based on the idea of reducing the more fundamental theory to the
less fundamental theory by applying some operation to the former theory.
The physicist would say that statistical mechanics reduces to thermo­
dynamics, if by applying some operation to the statistical mechanical
formalism, the equations of thermodynamics could be obtained. In this
study, the physicists' usage will be adopted. It will be said that the
primary theory reduces to the secondary theory, or that the new theory
reduces to the old theory.
One can also distinguish two general positions on intertheoretic
reduction. The orthodox view holds that such reductions are central to
scientific progress. A new scientific theory for a class of phenomena,
as a general rule, subsumes the prior theory for that domain. One
should be able to deduce the old theory from the new theory (cf. Nagel
1961:Ch. 11). The minority position is that science progresses by means
of "scientific revolutions" (Kuhn 1962). On this account, science
develops via conceptual revolutions, wherein one scientific paradigm
gives way to another. In many instances, this change of paradigm, or
change or world view, is so severe that the successive theories are
logically incommensurate.
Consistently maintaining either of these pOSitions also proves
to be problematic. The notion of scientific revolution is supposed to
explain how science progresses and develops. A new theory emerges
when, faced with theoretical anomalies, the scientific community begins
to view the data differently. The paradigm shifts, a new theory comes
forth, and the anomalies are resolved. On this account, an explanation
is forthcoming as to how a new theory might emerge, but the explanation
in terms of a change of paradigm isolates the new theory, logically and
conceptually, from its precursor. One is hard pressed, in this circum­
stance, to explain how scientific knowledge develops. Apparently we do
not progressively learn more about the physical world, rather from time
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to time we are prone to view things differently and offer new explanations
for our observations which need bear no conceptual relation to our
previous system of beliefs.
The orthodox view of progress by reduction also has a short­
coming, a shortcoming which is exemplified nicely in the purported
relation of classical mechanics to quantum mechanics as a limiting case.
The advantage of the orthodox view is that it does attempt to provide
some account of how scientific knowledge accumulates. A new theory for
a given range of phenomena subsumes, and in some case corrects, the
previous theory. The belief that the old theory can be derived from the
new one reflects our confidence in our ability to accumulate knowledge
about the world.
The difficulty with the thesis of scientific development by
reduction is that it seldom is the case that the old theory can be
derived exactly from the new one. Related to the thesis of development
by reduction is the doctrine of scientific realism. One tenet of
scientific realism is that well-confirmed theories are (in some sense)
approximately true. The primary problem with the orthodox view is in
clarifying this notion of approximate truth. For a successful reduction,
the reduced theory must be approximately true in a sense strong enough
to allow for a logical derivation of the old theory from the new one.
Proponents of the orthodox view recognize that the notion of an
approximate derivational reduction, a reduction where the primary theory
yields an approximation to the secondary theory, requires considerable
clarification (Sklar 1967:111, Schaffner 1967:136). The revolutionaries
attempt to refute or discredit the orthodox view by attacking the notions
of approximate derivation and approximate truth. They argue that if
only an approximation to the old theory can be derived from the new one,
then there can be no logical relation of reduction between the reduced
and the reducing theories, as in most cases the approximation to the old
theory is logically incompatible with the old theory (Feyera�nd 1962:
46-8, Kuhn 1962:Sec. IX).
Thus, the questions posed at the outset are closely related.
Philosophical positions on the issue of development by reduction
parallel the views of physicists on the nature of the relation between
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quantum and classical mechanics. Quantum mechanics is a well-confirmed
theory and one of our fundamental theories of physical phenomena.
Classical mechanics is a well-confirmed theory within its range of
applicability. If quantum theory, as a universal theory, does not
subsume classical mechanics in some sense, then one would have to
abandon the doctrine of scientific realism or admit that, contrary to
prevailing belief, one of the theories is not well-confirmed. The
orthodox physicist and the orthodox philosopher feel compelled to
maintain the connection between the theories on grounds that the
minority views have undesirable metaphysical and methodological conse­
quences. In order to maintain the orthodox positions, the philosopher
must give a convincing explication of approximate truth and the
physicist must give a rigorous characterization of the classical limit
of quantum theory.
The complications that plague the orthodox philosophical position
can be traced to two related sources, the formal framework within which
philosophers attempt to explicate reduction and the belief that the
reductive relationship between theories must be a relationship of strict
logical derivability.
The philosophical literature on reduction is characterized by
two kinds of discussion. In one type, reduction is discussed by means
of examples from theories. Here typical questions are of the form:
Is temperature definable as mean kinetic energy? Is a gene a muton,
a cistron, or a recon? (Schaffner 1967:142). The basic preoccupation
is with whether one term, say from genetics, can be defined in terms of
notions from molecular biology. This ordinary language approach can
offer no insight into the problems of approximate reduction because
there are no interesting cases of reduction where ordinary language
is the theoretical vernacular. Even if there were such cases, no
precise notion of limit or approximation would be forthcoming. Concepts
are either definable in terms of others or they are not, "approximately
definable" is a nonsensical notion. (Although it offers no solution to
the problems raised here, Teller (1971) does make some progress toward
explicating the relationship between ordinary language and scientific
language. The scientific concepts refine the concepts expressed in
ordinary language. For example, quantum mechanics refines our pre-
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scientific concept of position and refines it in a manner different
from the refinement suggested by classical physics.)
The second type of discussion attempts to introduce some formal
rigor by relying on the predicate calculus and model theory. These
formal discussions are not applicable in any straightforward manner to
particular cases of purported approximate reduction. For example, the
following are among the necessary and sufficient conditions Schaffner
puts on a successful reduction: (i) There is a correspondence, �,
between the primitive terms of the primary theory and the primitive
terms of the secondary theory; (ii) every n-place primitive predicate
of the secondary theory is effectively associated with an open sentence
in n free variables of the primary theory such that the open sentence
T(x) is true if and only if F(�(x » is true (Schaffner 1967:144).
n n
This kind of formal rigor is not very helpful. It is just not
the case that the theories of central interest in this debate are
formulated, or even can be readily formulated, in the predicate
calculus. What are the primitive terms and predicates of quantum
theory, Newtonian mechanics, or General Relativity? In these cases,
where approximate reductions and limiting cases are of crucial
importance, one is given no indication as to how proposed reduction
patterns are to be applied.
Sneed (1971) offers the most exhaustive attempt at a highly
formalized approach to reduction. However, on Sneed's account all that
is required for intertheoretic equivalence or intertheoretic reduction
is the existence of an appropriate mapping from the intended models of
one theory to the models of the other theory (Sneed 1971:Ch. VII).
Sneed's approach again assumes that the theories in question can be
readily formulated in the language of the predicate calculus. A more
serious fault is that Sneed's conditions on reduction contain no apparent
requirement that the reduction function preserve any structure between
the theories. If one is discussing a limiting case reduction between
two theories with such explicit mathematical structures as the quantum
and classical theories, one would expect, or one would at least like to
show, that as the limit is approached, the structure of quantum theory
approaches the structure of classical theory.
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One difficulty, then, in presenting and defending a notion of
approximate reduction is that the conceptual apparatus which the
philosopher brings to bear is not adequate for the task. This
difficulty can be overcome by noting that the interesting cases of
approximations and limits of theories arise most often with respect to
theories that have well-defined mathematical structures. In most of
these cases, the structures of the theories are such that one can employ
the methods of mathematical analysis. As a mathematical theory,
analysis provides a proven and natural idiom for discussing limits and
approximations.
The second difficulty a proponent of the orthodox position must
deal with in explicating the notion of an approximate reduction is the
belief that the secondary theory must be logically derivable from the
primary theory. This belief derives from the traditional logical
empiricist view that in a reduction the primary theory must explain the
secondary theory and that in any explanation the explanandum must be
logically derivable from the explanans. Here the orthodox philosopher
must recognize the cogency of the minority view criticism alluded to
above. In most cases, the primary theory and the secondary theory are
logically incompatible; so, the traditional, orthodox view could not
possibly succeed.
This criticism forces the orthodox philosopher to abandon the
narrow logical empiricist construal of explanation which over-emphasizes
the formal component of an explanation. The philosopher must also
consider the epistemological, or pragmatic, component of an explanation.
For discussions of reduction, the broadened outlook amounts to recognizing
that there is both a formal and a nonformal aspect to a successful
reduction. The formal aspect is concerned with the relation between
the languages of the primary and secondary theory. Where the theories
involved are capable of mathematical formulation, this becomes a concern
with the relation between the mathematical structures of the theories.
As a species of explanation, a satisfactory reduction must also satisfy
certain pragmatic or epistemological requirements which can be called
the non formal cmndit10ns oh an adeq�ate reduction. The orthodox tenet
of requiring some conceptual continuity between successive theories
can be maintained by requiring that an adequate reduction consists of
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defining some formal relation between the languages of the two theories
such that this relation, or reduction function, generates a plausible
account of the apparent success and the limitations of the secondary
theory in terms of the primary theory.
In this study, it will be shown that there is a definite sense
in which classical mechanics is a strict limiting case of quantum theory.
In the process of establishing an affirmative answer to the physical
question, it will also be shown that the relation between the two
theories is an example of an approximation or a limiting case reduction.
Chapter II is concerned with the formal aspect of the reduction.
The reduction function must be a structure preserving mapping between
the two formalisms. A discussion of abstract mechanics motivates a
decision as to which structures of the formalisms must be preserved,
yielding the formal conditions on the reduction. A transformation due
to Wigner (1932) is shown to be a natural choice for a reduction function.
Using methods of mathematical analysis, three propositions are derived.
On the basis of these propositions it can be claimed that the Wigner
transformation satisfies the formal conditions.
The nonforma1 conditions are discussed in Chapter III. It is
shown, with the aid of a reduction scheme due to G1ymour (1970), that
the Wigner transformation allows the formulation of an account of the
apparent success and the limitations of the classical theory. It is
concluded that the Wigner transformation provides an adequate reduction
of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics and that classical mechanics
is a limiting case of quantum mechanics as � + O. Finally, it is
argued that although the Wigner transformation leads to an adequate
reduction, it does not aid in solving the main interpretative problem
of quantum theory.
The discussion in this study is confined to the case of a non­
relativistic system with one degree of freedom. This simplification is
justified on two grounds. First, most of the interesting theoretical
problems already arise in this simple case. The results below can
easily be extended to systems of more degrees of freedom. Second, many
classical problems can be simplified to the one dimensional case. Where
this is not possible, classical mechanics continues to be a lively area
of mathematical research.
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II. FORMAL CONDITIONS ON THE REDUCTION
The formal conditions on an adequate reduction are most easily
determined by viewing a scientific theory as a collection of sentences
formulated in a formalized, mathematical language. If quantum mechanics
reduces to classical mechanics in the limit as h goes to zero, then
some relation between the mathematical structures of these two theories
must be demonstrated in this limit. In particular it must be shown
that the appropriate mathematical structures of the classical theory
can be derived from quantum theory as h � o.
According to the philosophical paradigm of reduction, this
derivation should be achieved by means of a reduction function which
maps the reducing theory into the reduced theory in such a way that
the essential mathematical relations within the theories are preserved
under the mapping. This suggests that the reduction function must be
some kind of homomorphism from the reducing theory to the reduced theory.
The kind of homomorphism required depends on the particular mathematical
structures involved. Thus, in order to formulate an acceptable reduction
function, it is necessary to specify explicitly the mathematical
structures of the theories involved in the reduction and to show that
the proposed reduction function is a homomorphism of these structures�
The essential mathematical structures involved become obvious
when quantum and classical mechanics are treated as two different
mathematical formalizations of an abstract concept of a mechanical
system. A mechanical system consists of a system of particles, or mass
points, the behavior of which is described by a law of motion. To
describe a mechanical system two types of entities, dynamical variables
and states, are posited, and two rules, a kinematical law and a
dynamical law, are given. The dynamical variables are a set of
properties of the system which are assumed to be pertinent to any
description of the dynamical behavior of the system. A state of a
system is simply the situation or disposition of the system's
constituent particles at an instant of time. The kinematical rule
relates the dynamical variables and states at an instant of time. At
each instant, every dynamical variable has a particular real value.
The kinematical law states a rule whereby the states of the system map
the dynamical variables onto the real numbers. The value this rule gives
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for a state and a dynamical variable at a time is called the expec­
tation value of that variable for that state at that time. This
kinematical rule is also such that given expectation values for all
dynamical variables of the system a unique state is determined. The
dynamical law is a rule telling how the states of the system change
over time. This abstract notion of a mechanical system is formalized
when suitable mathematical entities are chosen to represent the dyna­
mical variables and states, and the kinematical and dynamical laws are
represented by functional relationships between these entities. Abstract
mechanics is the study of the mathematical entities and structures which
can be employed in the formalization of a mechanical theory (cf.
Sudarshan 1962, Prosser 1966).
The basic assumption of abstract mechanics, and one that is most
difficult to motivate, is that the mathematical structure of the
dynamical variables can be derived from a free associative algebra over
the complex numbers. Under this assumption, for any two dynamical
variables their formal sum and formal product is also a dynamical
variable. The dynamical variables form a free algebra because it is
initially assumed that every distinct string of symbols represents a
distinct dynamical variable. For the present purposes, two dynamical
variables, position (q) and momentum (p), are of primary importance
because all other dynamical variables we will be concerned with are
functions of position and momentum. A second assumption made about the
dynamical variables is that only those elements of the free algebra
that are self-conjugate, A=A*, are admitted as physically significant




(A+aB) * = A*+iB*, a f; cL
(AB)* = B*A*
q*=q, p*=p
Self-conjugacy guarantees that when a physically significant dynamical
variable is measured the result of the measurement is always a real
number. The elements of the free algebra that are self-conjugate form
the set of observables.
Additional structure is imposed on the algebra by requiring that
some dynamical variables are equal to others. In classical mechanics it
is assumed that pq=qp, while in quantum mechanics it is assumed that
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pq-qp�/i. This assumption is motivated by physical considerations.
If the system under study obeys the laws of classical mechanics, then
according to classical theory observations can be made on the system
in such a way that disturbances on the system are negligible. The
order in which observations are made on the system. in particular
fundamental observations of position and momentum, is irrelevant.
Quantum mechanically, however, an observation has a non-negligible
effect on the observed system. Within the quantum formalism this fact
is reflected by the canonical commutation relation on the fundamental
dynamical variables, pq-qp=h/i (See Geroch n.d. :114). To incorporate
these physical facts into abstract mechanics, the algebra of observables
}lis taken to be the quotient algebra of the free algebra by an
appropriate ideal. Classically, the appropriate ideal is that
generated by the element pq-qp of the free algebra. In the quantum
mechanical case, it is the ideal generated by the element pq-qp-h/i
of the free algebra. This last assumption has the effect of partitioning
the free algebra into equivalence classes, each such class representing
a distinct dynamical variable.
The next task in the development of abstract mechanics is to
specify the set of admissable states, or the state space of the system.
The set of admissable states must map the elements of the observable
algebra � into the real numbers. Linear functionals over an algebra
map elements of that algebra into the field of the algebra. The
complex numbers form the field of�, so not all linear functionals on
� can represent states. Any element A of � is called strictly positive
if A=BB*. A linear combination of strictly positive elements of A with
real non-negative coefficients is called a positive element of the
algebra�. A positive linear functional over }Lis a linear functional
which maps positive elements of � into positive numbers, that is F is
positive if F(AA*) � O. The linear functional F is normalized if
F(U)=l, where II is the identity element of�. Thus, the set of states
is the set of positive normalized linear functionals over�.
This specification of the dynamical variables and the states
leads to a natural formulation of the kinematical rule which generates
expectation values. The expectation value of A in state f is the value
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of the linear functional f(A). Linear functionals on �form a space
which is called the dual space of�. Formally an inner product is a
mapping which assigns to each pair (f,A) a scalar from the field of;l.
So the kinematical rule for calculating expectation values is given
by taking the inner product of the state with the dynamical variable.
This completes the kinematical structure of a mechanical theory.
The characterization of the dynamical law requires the intro­
duction of another mathematical structure, a Lie algebra. The elements
of the Lie algebra� are the dynamical variables. The product in the
Lie algebra is a nonassociative product [A,B] such that
fA, B J = - [B ,A]
[A,[B,C]l + (B,[C,A]] + (C,[A,B]) = 0
making X a non-associative algebra. The algebras A. and.;( are related
by the requirement that the product in}l and the product in .r satisfy
[A B,C] = A [B,C] + (A,C] B.
When this condition is satisfied, one says that the Lie product is a
derivation in a linear associative algebra with the product A B. If
a particular associative algebra is chosen as)l, it is said that )L
provides a realization of rA. by derivations.
To specify the dynamical law, a particular element, H, of Jl,
called the Hamiltonian for the system, is designated. The dynamical
law is given by
d
dt F
= - [F, H].
In this abstract scheme the dynamical law can be viewed as defining the
dynamical operator d/dt. The dynamical operator d/dt operating on an
element of the algebra F is equal to the negative of the Lie product of
F with the Hamiltonian element.
The formalization of the concept of a mechanical system can be
summarized as follows: A theory of mechanics consists of a linear
associative algebra A., of dynamical variables which provides a realization
of the Lie algebra;( by derivations. States are normalized, positive
linear functionals over)L. As particular types of mechanical theories,
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classical mechanics and quantum mechanics share this abstract structure.
They differ in being different representations of this abstract structure.
In classical mechanics the basic dynamical variables are position
and momentum, q and p. These are associated with the points on a two­
dimensional Euclidean space called the classical phase plane. The elements
of the associative algebra � are all analytic functions of p and q.c
Classical point mechanics treats of the situation in which ideal,
perfect data is available. Under such circumstances a state is specified
by a point on the phase plane; that is, by an exact value of q and an
exact value of p. Statistical mechanics allows for the possibility that
such an exact state description might be unattainable in practice. Where
ideal precision is unattainable, a state is not represented by a point on
the phase plane but rather in terms of an area of the plane, reflecting
the inaccuracy of the specification. The earlier definition of a state
in abstract mechanics as any normalized positive function in the state
space is intended as a general definition of a state which covers the
broader notion of state used in statistical mechanics.
Where ideal data are not attainable, one cannot ask whether a par­
ticle is at point (q,p) at t; one can only ask with what probability a
particle can be found within a given area of the phase plane at t. This
requires that states be given a statistical characterization. Classically,
a state is then represented by a probability density on the phase plane,
p, called a Liouville density. The states of the system are statistical
states characterized by the set of Liouville density functions p(q,p).
Such a function of q and p prescribes the joint probability that the posi­
tion and momentum of a particle lie within any specified pair of ranges.
Consistent with the conditions placed on admissable states, the Liouville
density p(q,p) is normalized
J �(q,p)dpqp = 1
and for any function of the canonical coordinates, A(q,P), the expectation
value is given by
<A(q,p» = f A(q,p)p(q,p)dqdp
which is an inner product of the functions A(q,P) and �(q,p) on the phase
plane. Note that from the normalization condition it follows that the
-1
physical dimension of p(q,p) is [(qp) ].
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The algebra II serves as a real:lza tj._on of the Lie algebra l by
c c
derivations as required, where the Lie product is the familiar Poisson
bracket; for A(q,p) and B(q,p)
{A B} = aA aB _ aA aB,
aq ap ap aq
The Poisson bracket, as the Lie product for classical statistical mechanics,
gives the dynamical law
d� p(q,p) = -{p(q,p) , H(q,p)}
where p is a Liouville density and HE � is the Hamiltonian of the system.
c
In this form the dynamical law is called the Liouville equation.
In quantum mechanics position and momentum are also basic dynamical
variables, but position and momentum are represented by noncommuting Hermi-
tian operators Q and P. The elements of the algebra lLQ are all "analytic
functions" of these two noncommuting operators considered as formal power series.
Quantum mechanical states are usually represented by wave functions
�(q), which are elements of a Hilbert space. When the arguments of the wave
functions are position coordinates, q's, one is said to be in the coordinate
representation. A quantum mechanical system can also be described by wave
functions that take momentum values as arguments, �(p). This is called the
momentum representation. The two representations are equivalent and are
related by a Fourier transformation
�(p) = _L f .dq 'IjJ(q) e-ip q/h-.'27rl'r
The observables are then Hermitian operators on the Hilbert space. To
strengthen the analogy with classical mechanics, a quantUm mechanical state
here will be represented by a von Neumann density operator or, in von Neu­
mann's words a "statistical operator" (von Neumann 1955:315). Von Neumann
showed that each quantum state represented by a wave function can be asso­
ciated with a density "matrix" defined (in the coordinate representation) by
*
p(q,q') = 'IjJ(q)'IjJ (q').
This can be thought of as an infinite dimensional matrix where q labels the






p(q,q') = p (q' ,q)
Trp = /p(q,q)dq = 1
2·




Note that these are exactly the formal properties that an admissable state
function must satisfy. The diagonal elements of p give the probability
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density for finding a system at coordinate q. Also note that from (ii)
it follows that the physical dimension of the �on Neumann density matrix
p(q,q') is (q-l).
The density matrix also provides a ready characterization of quantum
mechanical pure states and mixed states or mixtures. A pure state is a
state of maximum specificity and is represented by a single vector in the
Hilbert space. A state which is represented with the help of at least two
states is said to be a mixture. A pure state cannot be represented as a
mixture of two others. When states are described by density matrices one
has that
= I dqd�'p(q,q')p(q',q) [= 1,< 1, p a pure sta tep a mixed state.
The density matrix, or the density operator, must map vectors of the
Hilbert space linearly into vectors of the Hilbert space. The density
operator can be expressed as a linear integral operator
p(o/(q» = f p(q,q')o/(q')dq' = o/'(q)
where p(q,q') is called the kernel of the operator p. By the above defini­
tion of the von Neumann density, p is a positive definite, symmetric kernel;
hence, by Mercer's theorem (Courant and Hilbert 1937:138) the density matrix
can always be expanded as




IF (q)F *(q)dq = 0, m # nn m
that is, the density operator can always be expanded in terms of its eigen­
functions. A pure state corresponds to the situation where only one of the
A is non-zero and takes the value unity.
n
If states are represented by density matrices, the prescription for
calculating expectation values becomes
<A> = f A(q,q')p(q',q)dqdq' = TrAp.
By definition the inner product of two operators A and B is the trace of
*
the product A B. This again is consistent with the role of an inner product
in the kinematical structure of a mechanical theory, as observed in the
above presentation of abstract mechanics.
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The algebra 7l.Q provides a realization by derivations of,A Q where the
Lie product is given by
[A,B] = ih [AB - BA].
The dynamical law is expressed in terms of the Lie product operation. Where
p is a von Neumann density and H the Hamiltonian operator, the time develop­




This equation is due to von Neumann and is frequently called the quanta1
Liouville equation on the basis of its similarity to the classical Liouville
equation.
Approaching the reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics
by way of abstract mechanics results in an explicit statement of what an
adequate reduction function must achieve. Formally, a successful reduction
of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics as rr + a requires that classical
kinematics and dynamics be derivable from quantum theory in this limit. �Q
andlQ are the mathematical structures representing quantum kinematics and
dynamics. An adequate reduction func tion should map It Q
to �c and i.Q to Xc
homomorphica11y as rr + O. Such a mapping allows for the recovery of classical
kinematics and dynamics from quantum theory in the desired limit. Specifi-
*
cally, the mapping from the elements of �Q to � should map the trace of A B
to an inner product of A{q,p) and B(q,p) on the phase plane, the product in
�Q to the product in �c as h + 0, and ap/at to ap/at + O{h) where as h + a the
error term O(h) also goes to zero.
Classical statistical mechanics represents states of a system
by Liouville density functions on the classical phase plane. In von
Neumann's formulation of quantum theory, states are represented by von
Neumann density operators. Eugene Wigner, in "On the Quantum Correction
for Thermodynamical Equilibrium" (Wigner 1932), derived a transformation
function, the Wigner transformation, which maps von Neumann density
operators to density functions on the classical phase plane. This
suggests that the Wigner transformation might serve as a reduction
function from quantum mechanics to classical statistical mechanics.
Wigner's paper appeared at a time when attempts were being made
to interpret quantum theory as a theory of classical probabilistic or
stochastic processes. These attempts were based on formal analogies
between quantum equations and classical transport or diffusion equations.
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The similarity between the SchrBdinger equation and a classical
diffusion equation was noted by Schrodinger (Schrodinger 1931, 1932).
However, in Schrodinger's mind the disanalogies far outweighed the
analogies and he neither endorsed nor suggested a stochastic inter­
pretation of quantum theory. In the same vein, Furth showed that just
as there is a stochastic analog to the SchrBdinger equation there is
also a stochastic analog to the Heisenberg uncertainty relations
(Furth 1933).
Wigner's 1932 paper encouraged the search for classical inter­
pretations of the quantum theory. His result suggested that the relation
between quantum and classical theory might be stronger than mere formal
&lalogy. Wigner observed that the relative probability of momentum and
position for a classical statistical density function is given by
(-l/kT)H�(q,p)dqdp = e dqdp
where k is Boltzmann's constant, T the absolute temperature, and
H = p2/2m+V the classical Hamiltonian. For a quantum mechanical system,
the expectation value of a physical quantity is given by von Neumann's
prescription
where A is the operator representing the quantity> H the quantum
Hamiltonian, and eC-l/kT)H the van Neumann density operator representing
the state in question. Explicit calculations using the von Neumann
density proved to be cumbersome. Wigner's insight was that for a wave
function �(q), and hence for its associated von Neumann density, a
density function p on the phase plane could be constructed by
�(q.p) = fW(q-T/c) e(i/�)TP W*{q+T/2)dT.
The resulting density p(q,p), called the Wigner density, is always real
but is not everywhere positive. It has the following interesting
properties: (i) When integrated with respect to p it yields the correct
quantum mechanical expectation values for position; (ii) when integrated
with respect to q it yields the correct quantum mechanical expectation
values for momentum; (iii) by applying classical techniques it yields the
correct quantum mechanical expectation values of any function of position
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or any function of momentum for a given state; (iv) it similarly yields
the correct expectation values for a sum of a function of position and
a function of momentum.
The appearance of the Wigner transformation encouraged the belief
that quantum theory could be interpreted as a classical probabilistic
theory. The Wigner transformation maps quantum mechanical states to
density functions on the classical phase plane whereupon in many cases
classical methods yield the correct quantum mechanical expectation
values. Wigner himself recognized the major obstacle to following
through on such a program: The Wigner transformation is not everywhere
positive. Probabilities must be non-negative; hence, Wigner believed
that his density function could not be consistently interpreted as a
s�multaneous probability. Wigner viewed his transformation function
as a discovery of practical importance that facilitated calculations.
He felt that even though the Wigner density can assume negative values,
this "must not hinder the use of it in calculations as an auxiliary
function which obeys many relations we would expect from such a
probability" (Wigner 1932: 751) •
Other attempts were made at defining an appropriate joint distri­
bution function which would satisfy the conditions on a probability
density. Most notable of these attempts were the papers of Groenewold
(1946) and Moyal (1949). Moyal concluded that the theoretical diffi­
culties with any such joint distribution are such that it could not be
employed to generate an interpretation of quantum mechanics as a
classical statistical theory. However, such functions could be used
to solve quantum mechanical problems by the methods of classical
probability theory. More recently Cohn has shown that no such trans­
formation function can preserve the desired functional relationships
between observables (Cohn 1966). These findings have relegated the
Wigner transformation to the realm of practical problem solving and
have discouraged the belief that one could formulate quantum theory as
a classical probability theory. (In Chapter III, these theoretical
deficiencies of the Wigner transformation will be related to the proofs
that a hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics cannot be
given. )
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The theoretical deficiencies of the Wigner transformation suggest
that it is impossible to use the transformation to interpret quantum
mechanics as a classical statistical theory. However, the deficiencies
of the Wigner transformation are not such as to preclude its use as a
reduction function to show that in some sense, specifically in some
appropriate limit, quantum mechanics reduces to classical statistical
mechanics. The Wigner transformation depends on the value of hj hence,
it does make sense to inquire as to what becomes of the image of a von
Neumann density on the classical phase plane as h � O. It is also
non-singular, as will be shown below, so the transformation and its
inverse provide a means to go back and forth between the quantum and
classical formalisms.
Although the Wigner transformation appears to satisfy several
requirements on a reduction function, nothing has been said about the
theoretical basis of this transformation. The transformation is not
merely a formal trick that happens to yield the desired result. The
next task will be to show that the Wigner transformation, W, and its
-1
inverse, W ,can be derived uniquely given the structure of classical
and quantum mechanics.
Before embarking on the derivation of the Wigner transformation,
some insight can �e gained into the nature of the task by examining
the structure of the transformation. The Wigner transformation takes a
von Neumann density





C(q,p) = � dae1P p(q-.an/2, q+ a�/2).
The action of the Wigner transformation on a von Neumann density can be
described by saying that it consists of a linear substitution of
variables, q-�/2 for q and q+�/2 for q', and a Fourier transformation
of the resulting von Neumann density.
One fact about the quantum and classical theories will be used in
the derivation of the Wigner transformation. The derivation will exploit
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the fact that both classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are
invariant under the transformations of the Galilean group. The
requirement of Galilean invariance for both theories dictates that
this invariance must be preserved under the reduction. Hence, an
additional requirement on W and W-l is that they must be invariant
under the transformations of the Galilean group, which is to say that
W and W-l must commute with the action of the Galilean group. If the
transformation can be derived from quantum and classical theory under
this assumption, then it can be justifiably claimed that the Wigner
transformation provides a natural reduction function between the quantum
and classical theories.
The requirement that Wand W-l be invariant under the Galilean
group leads naturally to the employment of various notions from repre­
sentation theory in the derivation of the Wigner transformation. A
representation of an abstract topological group on a vector space H is
a homomorphism
IT: G -+ GL(H)
of G into a group of continuous linear automorphisms of the space H such
that for every element v of H the map of G into GL(H) given by
x � IT(x)v
is continuous. A given abstract group can have different representations
on different spaces. For example,
IT: G -+ GL(H)
IT ': G -+ GL(H')
Representations of groups on a vector space form an algebraic category
where the morphism of the category is called an intertwining operator or
a coupling operator. An intertwining operator between representations
is a continuous linear map, A: H -+H', between the spaces such that for










In other words, the intertwining operator A commutes with the action of
the group on H and H' •
The assumption of Galilean invariance for both quantum and
-1
classical theory requires, as mentioned above, that Wand W commute
-1
with the action of the Galilean group. Hence, Wand Ware inter-
twining operators between the Galilean group as represented on the
classical phase plane and the Galilean group as represented on the space
of von Neumann densities.
The Galilean group, which consists of all translations of
position and concurrent changes in velocity (or in momentum) is an
abelian group, as a total change in position and momentum is indifferent
to the order in which incremental changes are imposed. Any element of
the Galilean group evidently may be expressed as a product of two
elements, drawn from the two subgroups which give translations in position
alone and shifts in momentum alone. An element of the former subgroup,
which translates position by an amount q, we will call Q , a member of
q
the latter subgroup which shifts momentum by an amount p we will call P •
P
The subgroup elements have an evident natural action upon functions










The set of functions on the phase plane comprise a "function space,"
that is, a very big vector space, whereby equations (1) and (2) define
actions of Q and P as linear operators upon a vector space. That is
q p
to say (1) and (2) define a representation of the Galilean group. Now
a representation (with complex scalars) of an abelian group may be
resolved into irreducible representations which are one dimensional,
with each group element represented by a complex number on the unit
circle. We now resolve our representation, of Galilean actions upon
functions of the phase plane, in this way. We seek a function
!Sks(q',P') upon the phase plane which has the two properties that
= eikq �
I-Iks (3)
= ispe ISks• (4)
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Evidently the function sought is
-ikq' -isp'
�ks(q',P') = e e (5)
as substitution of (5) into (1) and (2) shows at once. Moreover, a
general normalized function on the phase plane can be resolved as a
superposition into I-dimensional representation functions of the form
(5), as
f -ikq' -isp'�(q' ,p') = dkdse e c(k,s) (6)
simply asserts that normalized functions on the phase plane may be
expressed as Fourier integrals. The appropriate weighting coefficient
c(k,s) for any given Liouville density �(q,p) is given by the familiar
Fourier integral inversion formula
1 f ikq ispc(k,s) = (2n)2 dqdp e e �(q,p). (7)
We will now express the way in which Galilean transformations
act upon the quantum mechanical von Neumann density operators. As
these density operators correspond to integral kernels, which are
members of a function space, we will again obtain a representation of
the Galilean group as a set of linear operators. This representation
may be resolved into irreducible one dimensional representations, which
prove to have a one-to-one relationship with counterparts which we have
already found on the classical phase plane, at equation (5). Finally
we may define a linear transformation which carries each irreducible
subspace in the space of von Neumann densities to its irreducible
counterpart on the classical phase plane; that transformation is the
Wigner transformation.
The Galilean subgroup of position transformations perform shifts
in the origin of the position coordinate; the member Q shifts the
q
origin by an amount q. This subgroup thus has a natural action on
functions p (q' ,q "'- in the space of von Neumann densities:
Q p(q',q") = p(q'-q, q"-q).
q
The action of P on von Neumann densities is less immediate. We note
p
first its natural action upon wave-functions W(q'): If for the set of
(8)
momenta p', W (q') describes the set of quantum-mechanical pure states,
p




P � ,(q') = � , H(q').
p p p -p
(9)
The momentum pure states are by definition the eigenfunctions of
translation
-ip'q'/h
�p,(q') = e (10)
whence by substitution in (9), and back to (10),
Pp�p,(q') = e-i(p'-p)q'/h = eipq'/h �p,(q'). (11)
We note the coefficient exp (i p q'/h) is independent of the momentum
pure state's momentum value p'. As any pure state �(q') may be built up
from a superposition of momentum states, we have in general
P �(q') = eipq'/h �(q').
p
(12)
Now a general von Neumann density p(q',q") may be constructed from a
superposition of densities for pure states, of the form
*
p�(q' ,q") = �(q')�(q")
and by (12) the action of P on such a density operator is
p
(13)
P p (q' q")
p �
, (P �(q'»(P �(qll»* = eipq'/h�(q')e-ipqll/h$(qll)*
p p
(14)
As the coefficient exp(ipq'/h).·exp(-ipq"/h) does not depend on
$, by the superposition property we have in general
Ppp(q',qll) = eip(q'-q")/hp(q' ,q"). (15)
Equations ($ and (15) are the Galilean transformation counterparts, for
von Neumann density functions, of the Galilean transformation equations
on the classical phase plane, (1) and (2). These Galilean transformation
equations are both less symmetric and less familiar than their classical
counterparts (1) and (2), whence the job of finding the one-dimensional
irreducible representation functions is not quite trivial. However,
the abelian nature of the Galilean group implies that such functions
Pks(q',qU) exist, and satisfy
*
The minus sign appears as a matter of convention: We index the group
element in accordance with its action on the function rather than the
coordinate system. This is the same convention which we have already
adopted in the classical case.
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ikq
= e Pks (16)
(17)
in analogy to equations (3) and (4) for the classical case.
If we eliminate Q Pk from equations (8) and (16), and likewiseq s
eliminate P Pk from equations (15) and (17), we obtainp s
Pks (q' -q ,q"-q)
ikq
= e P ks (q' ,q ") (18)
i (' ") /+t i
e
p q -q
Pks(q' ,q") = e SPPks(q' ,q").
These two equations, which express both the action of the Galilean
(19)
group on quantum-mechanical density operators, and the defining property
of irreducible one-dimensional representations, must determine the form
of the representation functions Pks(q',q"). We now undertake that
determination, starting with equation (18).
In form, (18) is a functional equation. For convenience let
Pks
= exp r
and take the logarithm of equation (18); the result is
(20)
r(q'-q, q"_q) - r(q', q") = i k q. (21)
This is a linear, inhomogeneous functional equation for the unknown
function r. It shares a generic property of linear inhomogeneous
equations: Its general solution is of the form
r = rp + rH
where rp is any particular solution to equation (21) and rH is the most
general solution to the homogeneous equation
(22)
rH(q'-q, q"-q) - r(q', q") = O.




9 29 • (24)
(We have chosen to maintain q' and q" on a formally synnnetric footing
so far.) As the homogeneous equation (23) must hold for all free choices
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of q, q', q", it must hold if in particular we choose q = q", ""hence
(23) becomes
rH(q',q") = r(O,q'-q"). (25)
Thus rH(q' ,q") must be a function only of the difference q'-q". We
observe that an arbitrary function of that difference, rH(q '-q"),
evidently solves the homogeneous equation (23), whence the most general
solution to equation (21) is
'+ "
r(q' ,q") =-ikq 29 + rH(q'-q") (26)
where rH(q) is arbitrary. If we let exp rH=F, then (20) gives back
the corresponding solution to the original functional equation (18):
. q'+q"-l.k(- -)
Pks(q',q") = e 2 F(q'-q") (27)
where F(u) is an arbitrary function. We observe that the general
solution (27) to the functional equation (18) could have been derived
without resort to logarithmic transformation: That transformation
simply enabled us to appeal to classical results which apply to linear
equations, which saved our having to prove the "exponentials" of those
results for ourselves.
We have not yet used the "momentum shift" equation (19), whose
demand upon Pks now can, at most, specify the form of F(q'-q").
Substitute the solution (27) into (19):
eiP(q'-q")/hF(q'_q") = eisPF(q'_q") (28)
where we have divided both sides by the common non-zero factor
exp(-ik(q'+q")/2). To simplify (28) let q'-q" = u, whence
�(u-hS)
e F(u) = F(u) (29)
Thus either
F(u) = 0 (30)
(31)or u - tis = 0,
so F(u) must be of the form
F(u) = AQ(u - 11s) (32)
where A is a yet undetermined constant. Thus finally, fro� both
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-ike 2 ) M (q' -q"-hs) (33)
which follows most directly from (32) and (27). The constant A we will
regard as fixed, at a value which we will choose below for our con­
venience.
The functions Pks(q',q") given by (33) are the I-dimensional
representation functions for the action of the Galilean group upon the
space of von Neumann densities, as substitution into equations (17),
(18) will demonstrate (with equation (18) the vanishing-property of the
ofunction must be used). These representation functions also form a
complete basis for the space of von Neumann densities, in the usual
sense that an arbitrary density may be expanded in the form
P (q' ,q") = J dkdr;>Pks (q' q") c(k,s) • (34)
The proof, which we only sketch, is the following: The integral on s
may be performed at once, as it only involves the ofunction; the
remaining integral is a Fourier transformation from the variable k to
the variable (q'+q")/2, and completeness follows from the non-singular
nature of the Fourier transform.
The Wigner transformation now may be defined by its action on




W(Ae ike 2 )O(q'-q"-hs» = e4.kqe-iSp, (35)
or
(36)
where q, p are the coordinate and momentum of the classical phase plane.
We note that the Wigner transformation is parametric in Planck's constant
�, but this dependence appears at only one place, where it relates the
scale of the coordinate q to that of the reciprocal momentum s.
All that remains is to derive expedient expressions for the ways
-1
in which W and W carry a general member of the one function space to a
-1
member of the other. The easier choice is to first calculate how W
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moves a function on the phase plane to the space of von Neumann
densities. Using equation (36), let W-1 act upon �(q,p) as given
by equation (6):
q '+Q"-ike )
w-1,s (q ,p) =p (q I ,q") =1dkds e 2 0( q I -q"-hs) c(k, s)





o (q' ,q")=(l/n)A dke c(k,q �q ).
g'-g"Now evaluation of c(k, h) in terms of �(q,p), from equation (7) gives
q'+g" g'-g"
J
ike q 2 ) i( oft ) p




The integral on k is
9'+9"
1 I
ike q 2) 9 '+Q"
2TI
dke = o(q 2 ) (40)
q '+g"
so that in (39) the integral on q simply replaces �(q,p) by �( 2 ,p)




i ( h ) P q '+q"p(q' ,q") - dpe �(- - p)2'JTh tJ 2 ' • (41)
We may now evaluate the constant A by requiring that the Wigner trans­
formation preserve the property of normalization, namely:
fdq'p(q',q') = IdqdP/S(q,P) (42)
Set q"=q' in (41) and integrate on q'; we see that (42) is immediately
satisfied if we let
A-=2rlT (43)
Equation (41) for W-1 is in the form of a Fourier transform on the
variable (q'_q"), with the other independent variable (q'+q")/2 simply
playing the role of a fixed parameter.
The inverse transformation, for W, is easily evaluated. In (41),
let q'_q"=X and (q'+q")/2=q. Solving these relations simultaneously
for q' and q" yields
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q' = q + x/2
q" = q - x/2
(44)
Substituting these values of q' and q" into (41) gives
x x A J ixp/h �r(x,q) = p(q + 2 ' q - 2 ) = 2nh dpe p(q,p) (45)
or
1 1 J ixp/h �A r(x,q) = 2n dxe p(q,p). (46)
Thus, we have expressed the von Neumann density as a Fourier transform
of a Liouville density, where p is the Fourier variable and q is a
parameter. But then by the Fourier integral theorem we have that
J -ixp/h:l 1 J -ixp/h x x )p(q,p) = dxe �r(x,q) = A dxe p(q + 2 ' q - 2 . (47)
If in (47), we let x = -ah, then
00 -00
-00





)2 ,q 2 (48)p(q,p) -AI J d -ixp/h ( + �= ae . p q 2' q
or
�(q,p) = 2� J daeiap p(q - a; , q + a; ) (49)
which is exactly the Wigner transformation as it was quoted above.
-1
Wand W provide one-to-one mappings between the space of
classical density functions and the space of von Neumann densities.
By linearity this result extends to elements of AQ and �c· ThepPks(q,p)
form a complete basis for the classical space. By elementary Fourier
�
analysis, any function A(q,p) on the classical space can be expressed as




where ask = P ks(q,p)A(q,p)dqdp. This is a statement of completeness.
Wand w-l, as intertwining operators, take one dimensional representations
to one dimensional representations; hence, the completeness is inherited
by the images in the space of von Neumann densities, and the Pks(q',q")
form a complete basis for the Hilbert space on which the von Neumann




This derivation of the Wigner transformation from the assumption
of Galilean invariance, justifies the Wigner transformation as a
natural choice for a reduction function between quantum and classical
mechanics. Even though it is a natural choice for a reduction function,
if it is to be an adequate reduction function, it must satisfy the
formal conditions on such a function. These formal conditions, based
on the discussion of abstract mechanics, are that the function map�Q
into lL and J;Q into.x homomorphically as 1t -+ O. Several propositionsc -1 c
concerning Wand W will be established showing that the Wigner
transformation fulfills these formal conditions and hence that classical
mechanics is a bona fide limiting case of quantum mechanics. The
following operations will be investigated: (i) Products of von Neumann
densities as 1t -+ 0; (ii) commutators of von Neumann densities as 1t -+ 0;
(iii) anti-commutators of von Neumann densities as 1t -+ O.
The general strategy of the proofs is to begin with two Liouville
densities defined on the classical phase plane. Apply the inverse
Wigner transformation to carry the Liouville densities to the space of
von Neumann densities. Compose the resulting von Neumann densities in
the appropriate (quantum mechanical) manner. Apply the Wigner trans­
formation to the result and show that as 1t -+ 0 the image of the Wigner
transformation is the result of the analogous composition of the
original classical densities in the classical phase plane. The reason
for starting with classical densities and carrying them to the space of
the von Neumann densities, composing, and returning to the classical
space is merely the need to be explicit as to what stays fixed when
limits are being taken. The arbitrary choice is that the classical
density functions stay fixed.
Let p, cr denote von Neumann densities, �, 6 denote functions
on the classical phase plane, p denote the Fourier transform of
�[(q'+q")/2, p] with respect to its second argument, and Pk denote
the first derivative of p with respect to its kth argument. The basic




p a (q , ,q") = W p a ( q J p) +0 (fr) •
Proof. By definition of the inverse Wi�ner transformation
The product of von Neumann densities is given by
pa(q',q") = fdY p(q',y)a(y,q").
Let q" = y in (50) and q' = y in (51). Then
���a[ 2 ' iT ]. (52)
Add and subtract q"/2 from the first argument of p and add and
subtract q'/2 from the first argument of a in (52)
J '+" (-q"±y)pa(q' ,q")= dyp[q 2q + 2 .L:Y � q '+q" (-q '±y) �iT ]a[ 2 + 2 'iT]
f - q '+q" iT (-q"+y) .L:Y � q '+q" !! (-q '+y) �= dyp [ 2 + '2 iT 'iT ] a [ 2 + 2 ft- 'h ] (53)
Expand the integral in (53) as a power series in iT, obtaining
J r� q '+9" n '-v h v-n" � q '+q"
n'-v
pa(q' ,q") = dy!_p[ 2 ' hl + '2 h Pl[- 2- , "h] X
'+ " " iT ' '+ " "� 2X "!'[q 9 �] + - zza; - [q q .L:!L] + O(iT )a 2 'iT 2 rr a1 2 ' iT
_
• (54)
Carrying out the multiplication and recomhining terms yields
f '+" n'-v q'+q" v-n"pa(q' ,q") = dY�H9 29 , "h] cr [- 2- , "h] +
iT f [� 9 '+9".L:Y � � q '+9" �+ '2 dy 'p 1 [ 2 ' iT]· iT 0-[ 2 ' h ]-
(] '-v _. q'+q" n '-v 9 '+q" v-n" l 2
- "h p[- 2- , "hl °1 [ 2 ' �]J + O(ir ). (55)
In both integrals (q '+q,") /2 appears simply as a parameter.
i(X), k(x) on the real line, their convolution is defined as
For functions
t*k(x) = fdY t(x-y)k(y) = fdY k(x-y)t(y).
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The same rule of convolution holds for translations �(x-z), k(x-z)
t*k(x-z) = fdY t(x-y)k(x-z) = fdW t[(x-z)-w]k(w).·
The first integral in (55) is a convolution. A fundamental result of
Fourier analysis is the Convolution Theorem: The Fourier transform of
the product of two functions equals the convolution of the Fourier
transform. Accordingly,
f � q'+q" n'-v "! q'+q" v-n" ."....._, q'+q" q'_q" -1dy p[- 2- , �] o[ 2-'�] = p·o[- 2- , - n- ] = W �6(q,p) (56)
Another basic relation in Fourier an�lysis is that if f(�) is the
Fourier transform of f(x), then �f(�) is the Fourier transform of
"
id/dx f(x). This relation and the Convolution Theorem allow one to
express the second integral in (55) as
n f r� 9'+q" � • � � q'+q" � -"2 dy I:' 1 [ 2 ' h-] h- 01 2 ' h ]
� "" q'+q" � ':'" q'+qll- .
h- p [ 2 ' h- ] 01 [ 2 '
ih- -1 a a a a
=
-z W [aqp(q,p) ap &(q,p) - ap �(q,p) aq a(q,p)]. (57)
So combining (56) and (57)
-1 ih- -1 2
po(q' ,q") = W �6(q,P) + 2' W {p(q,p), 6(q,p)} + O(w ). (58)
Therefore, as h- � 0 only the first term in this expression remains and
-1
po(q' ,q") = W �6(q,P). (59)
In the limit as n � 0 under the action of the Wigner transformation the
noncommutative operator product in the space of von Neumann densities
becomes the commutative product defined in the classical space.
The results for commutators and anticommutators ate simple






= W {�,e} + O(h).





So in the limit as h + 0 under the action of the Wigner transformation
the Lie product in the space of von Neumann densities becomes the Lie
product in the classical space.
Proposition 3.
Proof.
If the power series expansion of pcr(q',q") in (54) is carried out one more
term, the Convolution Theorem and the result on the relation between
Fourier transforms and their derivatives can again be applied, allowing
one to calculate 0(h2) as
o ('iT2) -n-2 -1 ..2l a2�= "2 W [apaq apaq]
Then
Every operator in � and a fortiori every element of { can be
expanded in terms of the functions Q(g' ,q"). Propositions land 2 show
"-$
that the Wigner transformation carries the operator product of �Q to the
commuting product of Ac and the Lie product of ;(Q (commutator bracket) to
the Lie product of�c (Poisson bracket). In the limit as h + 0, the
Wigner transformation carries the quantum mechanical operation to its
classical counterpart homomorphica11y. The Wigner transformation is
then not only a natural choice for a reduction function; it is also a
33
reduction function which satisfies the formal requirements that have
been placed on such a function. Now it must be determined whether
the proposed reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics
by means of the Wigner transformation meets the nonformal conditions
on a reduction.
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III. NONFORMAL CONDITIONS ON THE REDUCTION
The results of the previous chapter show that the formal
requirements for a successful reduction of quantum mechanics to
classical mechanics are satisfied: A reduction function, the Wigner
transformation, maps �Q � Ac and�Q � � in such a way that as n � 0 the
classical kinematical and dynamical laws are recovered from the quantum
structure. Yet several nonformal requirements must be satisfied if
this reduction is to be entirely adequate.
These nonformal requirements derive directly from the philo­
sophical problem outlined in Chapter 1. The philosopher's interest in
reduction is a response to a common phenomenon in the development of
science. As a science develops theories are proposed and tested; some
are accepted as well-confirmed. In many instances, these well-confirmed
theories are found to be deficient in some respect and are replaced by
new, well-confirmed theories. A philosophical account of inter­
theoretic reduction is an attempt to give a rational account of the
process whereby one well-confirmed theory is superceded by another.
Given the assumption that science advances, the general theme of these
rational reconstructions is that the old theory must be explained or
accounted for by the new theory. Thus, intertheoretic reduction
becomes intertheoretic explanation in which the secondary science is
explained by the primary science.
The formal and nonformal requirements for an adequate reduction
mirror the formal and nonformal conditions .for an adequate explanation.
According to the accepted philosophical paradigm for explanation, the
explanandum must be derivable from a set of premises, the explanans.
In intertheoretical explanation the reduction function is intended to
mediate this derivation. Of course, the construction of such a
derivation does not guarantee that any explanation at all has been
given. For the present case, the Wigner transformation per � is a
function that maps a noncommutative operator algebra to a commutative
algebra of functions on the phase plane. This in itself tells us
nothing about the relation between quantum and classical mechanics as
physical theories. Such a formal relation is at best a necessary, and
certainly not a sufficient, condition for an adequate explanation of
classical mechanics by quantum mechanics.
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In fact, the formal relation does not treat the most interesting
facet of reduction, namely of how a well-confirmed theory can be
rationally replaced by another well-confirmed theory that is incom­
patible with it. This facet of reduction is addressed by the nonformal
requirements. Explanations are stories or accounts of a certain kind.
Usually an explanation gives an account of something poorly understood
in terms of something that is more clearly understood or an account of
some particular thing in terms of a more general framework. Thus,
there are pragmatic and epistemic features present in an explanation.
These features must also be present in any adequate intertheoretica1
explanation. The nonformal requirements which are of epistemic and
pragmatic character, ensure that the inductive support of the secondary
theory is passed on to the primary theory, thus showing how one we11-
confirmed theory can be replaced, consistently, by another wel1-
confirmed theory.
It is the requirement that the primary theory inherit the
inductive support of its predecessor that forces attention to the
epistemic and pragmatic aspects of reduction. These aspects, or the
nonforma1 conditions on a reduction, must pay special attention to
the particular interpretations of the mathematical formalisms of the
theories in question. Certain of the mathematical entities in each
formal structure are interpreted as standing for physical properties
of a system. Laws are statements relating the entities so interpreted.
Experiment and observation provide inductive support for the laws and
hence indirectly for the physical interpretation of the mathematical
formalism. If the nonformal conditions on reduction are to be met,
some account is required of how evidence for the primary theory is
related to that for the secondary theory.
The difficulty of specifying these conditions exactly is
exacerbated by the fact that in many cases the primary and secondary
theories are logically incompatible. The logical incompatibility of
the primary and secondary theories was the crux of Feyerabend's
critique of reduction given in Chapter I. To circumvent Feyerabend's
criticism, it is necessary to state the conditions under which an
approximate reduction obtains. Formally, the Wigner transformation
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serves this purpose well, as the Wigner transformation allows for the
recovery of the classical theory. This is achieved by taking the usual
interpretation of the quantum formalism and mapping it onto the classical
phase plane. The Wigner transformation generates a model for quantum
theory in terms of the classical quantities; that is. under that
transformation the quantum laws are approximations to classical laws
such that in the limit as h � 0 the approximations become the classical
laws. This relation in the limit is not a relation of logical deri­
vability but it is as strong a formal relation as one would expect to
obtain between logically incompatible theories.
Inductive support for a theory is generated when observation
gives evidence that the theory is true. If the theories are logically
incompatible, both of them cannot be true, and we were mistaken in
believing that one of the theories was well-confirmed. This compli­
cation leads to a natural formulation of inter-theoretical explanation
given by Glymour (1970:341):
Intertheoretical explanation is an exercise in the
presentation of counterfactuals. One does not
explain one theory from another by showing why the
first is true; a theory is explained by showing under
what conditions it would be true, and by contrasting
those conditions with the conditions that actually
obtain.
This is a natural formulation of the reductive relation in that the
emErgence of the new theory and the deficiencies of the old theory
reveal that the old theory is wrong, whereas the reduction tells us in
addition why we were wrong and how it was possible that the old theory
could have become accepted. This relation goes far beyond a mere
formal relation and does capture the pragmatic and epistemic aspects
of intertheoretic explanation.
For the case of quantum and classical mechanics the formal
condition as met by the Wigner transformation is that quantum theory
under its usual interpretation be modeled in the usual interpretation
of classical theory in such a way that as h � 0 this model of quantum
theory becomes a formulation of the classical theory. Such a reduction
function leads to an adequate reduction if the following two nonformal
conditions are also fulfilled:
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(i) Explanatory condition. The reduction must generate an
account of how and where the secondary theory was successful and
deficient, where this account is told in terms of the primary theory;
(ii) Unity condition. The reduction must unify physical theory.
Fulfillment of the first condition guarantees that the reducing
theory accounts for the phenomena that the reduced theory accounted for
and that it accounts for these phenomena in such a way that the
inductive support of the reduced theory is inherited by the reducing
theory. It is this condition, too, that contains the counterfactual
aspect of the reduction. The proposed account contains statements of
the form: "Classical statistical mechanics would be true if it were
the case that ••• " where the ellipses are replaced by some statement
that is contrary to fact about the structure of the physical world
correctly described by quantum theory.
As a simple example illustrating this condition consider the
relation between the van der Waals gas law and the ideal gas law. The
ideal gas law may be derived from the assumption that gas molecules
are point masses and that there are no forces of intermolecular
attraction present. To derive his law, van der Waals assumes that
molecules are solid spheres with weak intermolecular forces present.
The two laws are logically incompatible, as are assumptions on which
they are based. The ideal gas law would be true if molecules had no
volume and if there were no intermolecular forces. The ideal law
w�rks well in many cases because for extremely dilute gases, molecular
diameters and intermolecular forces are insignificant. It is possible
here to compare and contrast the conditions placed on the molecules by
the two laws and give an account in terms of the properties of the
van der Waals molecules of why the ideal law is generally incorrect
and why it worked as well as it did.
The unity condition has not been motivated as well as the
explanatory condition. The explanatory condition is concerned with
the inductive support of theories, the observational support for the
theories, and the inheritance of this inductive support in reduction.
Strong inductive grounding is one reason why theories are accepted.
A second subsidiary feature that might lead one to accept one theory
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over another is the degree of systematization that the theory imposes
on the phenomena in question. The degree of systematization, or the
theoretical simplicity or elegance, of a theory is not a feature that
is easily characterized. For the present purposes it can be said that
the degree of systematization is related to the number of ad hoc
assumptions the theory requires. Fewer ad hoc assumptions indicate
a greater degree of systematization. Another desideratum that a
reduction should fulfill is that some of the assumptions of the
secondary theory be derivable from the laws of the primary theory.
Fulfillment of this desideratum unifies physical theory in that it
shows that the primary theory has greater theoretical economy, allowing
the science to proceed on fewer ad hoc assumptions. This condition is
not usually considered in reductions of the kind treated here.
In our particular case, an investigation of whether the non­
formal requirements for a successful reduction are satisfied requires,
as we have seen, that certain relationships obtain between the specific
interpretations of the abstract algebras on which the Wigner trans­
formation acts. The process by which these interpretations are
formulated presents another interesting area of philosophical research.
It is not easy to specify how abstract mathematical entities are
endowed with empirical significance. As stated in the earlier dis­
cussion of abstract mechanics, it is extremely difficult to motivate
the assumptions leading to the rigorous mathematization of physical
theories. For the present purposes, it will be assumed that this
interpretative problem of the abstract algebras has been solved by
means of Weyl's group theoretic approach (see Stein 1972:Sec. XI).
It will be assumed that � is an operator algebra generated by the
operators P and Q which represent position and momentum. Likewise it
will be assumed that � is an algebra of functions generated by p and
c
q where these canonical coordinates represent position and momentum
in the classical theory.
Interestingly, we do not view the problem of interpreting the
classical formalism as presenting the same kind of difficulties as
interpreting the quantum formalism. As far as interpreting an abstract
formalism is concerned, it is difficult to motivate the interpretation
39
of either theory. However, these conceptual problems of interpretation
are not as pressing in the case of classical theory. The interpretation
we have adopted in the classical case is psychologically pleasing and
epistemologically accessible in that the interpretation is clear, vivid,
and easily visualized. One might say that we have an excellent model
of classical theory in terms of functions on the classical phase plane.
The dynamical variables and states of the theory are defined in terms
of this plane. For the physically interesting functions of position
and momentum, one can picture these functions on the phase plane. This
modelling process gives us the feeling that we have a clear under­
standing of what the notions of classical theory mean. This model puts
us epistemologically at ease with the classical theory, in a way that
we are not at ease with quantum theory. Classical theory is epistemo­
logically accessible in a way that quantum theory is not.
The epistemological accessibility of the classical theory can
be readily exploited to show that the first nonformal condition on a
reduction, the explanatory condition, is satisfied in this case. The
Wigner transformation maps quantum theory into classical theory. But
classical mechanics is formulated and visualized as a theory of the
classical phase plane; so, under W quantum mechanics can be formulated
as a theory of the phase plane. The proposed reduction function, when
this is viewed as operating on the interpreted observable algebras
)Q and Ac' allows us to compare and contrast the two theories on
common ground as different theories of the phase plane. Formal require­
ments on the quantum mechanical pure states impose a definite structure
on their phase-plane images, which leads to an explicit criterion
whereby it can be determined when classical mechanics can serve as an
adequate theory of the phase plane and when quantum mechanics must be
used. The criterion, although based on a formal requirement, is
rendered empirically significant by the connection between pure states
and measurement. Pure states are the states of maximum specificity
allowed by a theory given ideal measurements. On the assumption that
quantum mechanics is the true universal theory, it is the true theory
of the phase plane, and classical mechanics is at best an approximation
to it. The proposed criterion can be used to give an account, in terms
of quantum mechanics, of how "almost true" classical mechanics is, of
40
why classical mechanics appears to be true in certain cases, and of
why classical mechanics fails as a universal theory. This is just
the kind of account required by the first nonformal condition on an
adequate reduction.
The explanatory condition is the condition which a reduction
must satisfy if we are to be assured that some plausible account can
be given of how the primary theory might inherit inductive support
from the secondary theory. Because of the connection between pure
states and measurements, an investigation of what happens to pure
states under the action of the Wigner transformation and its inverse
should generate an account of the inductive and confirmatory relations
between the two theories.
Pure states are the states of maximal specificity. Classically,
a pure state is specified by giving precise numerical values for the
position and the momentum of a particle. These numerical values are
determined by measurement. A classical pure state is given by a
classical maximal meas.urement, the accurate determination of position
and momentum. According to classical theory it is possible in
principle to make such exact measurements. In classical statistical
mechanics, the pure states defined by maximal measurements are the
states of optimal knowledge from which all other density functions
can be constructed by taking convex superpositions of the pure states.
The pure states are represented on the phase plane by delta functions.
Quantum mechanical pure states are also states of maximal
specificity from which all other states can be constructed by taking
convex superpositions. A maximal measurement in quantum mechanics is
an�experiment designed to uniquely specify the wave function for a
system. The maximal measurements of quantum mechanics are motivated
and given operational meaning in expositions of the theory by recourse
to filtration experiments where a measurement on a system is construed
as a filter that selects for a value of a certain dynamical quantity.
Weyl gives a criterion for the determination of a pure state where the
experimental conditions S represent such filtration processes:
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We say that the conditions S' effect a greater
homogeneity than the conditions S if (1) every
quantity which has a sharp reproducible value
under S has the same definite value under S'
and if (2) there exists a quantity which is
strictly determined under S' but not under S.
The desired criterion is obviously this: The
conditions S guarantee a pure state if it is im­
possible to produce a further increase in
homogeneity (Weyl 1950:78).
Classically, maximal homogeneity is achieved when all quantities of a
system have a definite value. According to quantum mechanics some
quantities, such as position and momentum, are incompatible in that
they cannot both have precise simultaneous values. It is exactly this
situation that Weyl's criterion takes into account. Thus, a quantum
mechanical pure state must be specified by data somewhat less complete
than exact values for position and momentum. Yet this is still a pure
state determined by a maximal measurement and the conditi�ns for a
maximal measurement are the conditions of optimal precision for the
theory. Quantum mechanical pure states are represented in the space
of von Neumann densities by projection operators, p(x,x') = E (x,x')
n
*
'lJ( x) ¢ (x').
The pure states of each theory are specified by the maximal
measurements under each theory. Quantum mechanical pure states are
not as precise as the pure states hypothesized by classical theory;
each theory makes a different claim as to what is a theoretically most
precise observation. Under W both theories are theories of the phase
plane and maximal measurements can be compared as they relate to the
phase plane.
If quantum mechanics is the correct, universal theory, then the
maximal measurements allowed by quantum mechanics represent the
theoretically most precise determination of the state of a system.
One thing that quantum theory tells us, then, is that the precision
assumed by classical theory is illusory; there can be no classical pure
states. The images of the quantum mechanical pure states under the
Wigner transformation represent optimal knowledge of the system, as
expressed on the phase plane. Thus, quantum mechanics is the correct
"fine-grain" theory of the phase plane. If classical mechanics is to
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be applicable at all, it must be as an approximation to this correct
"fine-grain" theory. Classical mechanics can serve as an adequate
"coarse-grain" theory of the phase plane. It works reasonably well
if we do not look too closely at the phase plane with extremely precise
measuring instruments.
In order to investigate the relation between quantum and
classical pure states,* it will first be shown that the delta function
representing any classical pure state can be recovered, as h + 0, from
an appropriate wave function, or quantum mechanical pure state. Any
wave function o(q) which has an expectation value of position and
momentum can be expressed as
where q and p are particular values of position and momentum, and
c c
where the position dependence of the wave function has been scaled by





and p are the coordinates of
c
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The von Neumann density corresponding to this wave function is given by
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p(q,q') = lJl(q)lJl (q') =
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The Wigner transformation applied to this density gives
*
A particularly elegant relationship obtains between pure states of the
quantum-mechanical harmonic oscillator and functions on the classical
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What happens to this function on the classical phase plane as
h � 01 As h � 0, the negative exponentials drop off more rapidly and
will have an appreciable value only very near the point (q ,p ) on thec c
phase plane. But this is to say that as h � 0 the image of the quantum
mechanical pure state tends to a delta function 6(q-q , p-p ) on the
c c
classical phase plane. Delta functions represent classical pure
states; hence, as h � 0, the Wigner transformation allows one to
recover classical pure states. The classical pure states are literally
embedded in the set of quantum mechanical pure states as h � o.
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Investigating what happens to the formalism of quantum theory
as n � 0 was the topic of the previous chapter. As shown there, this
is a strictly mathematical problem which considers how the mathematical
entities of quantum theory behave in this limit. It was found that
in this limit the classical algebras could be recovered from the
quantum algebras. Here it has been shown that in this limit the
classical pure states can be recovered from the quantum pure states.
Although this is a formal result, nevertheless, it does tell us some­
thing about the relationship between the two theories. This result
can be interpreted as showing that a relation exists between two
physically possible worlds, the world as described by quantum mechanics
and another physically possible world as described by classical
mechanics. These worlds differ in that h has a non-zero value in the
quantum world and is equal to zero in the classical world. The
reduction shows that by making the counterfactual assumption that
n + 0, the classical world is accessible from the quantum world. The
accessability of the classical world from the quantum world in this
limit shows that classical mechanics is literally embedded in quantum
theory as n + O. If a theory is explained by showing under what
conditions it would be true and by contrasting these conditions with
the conditions that obtain in the actual world, then part of that
explanation is given by literally letting h go to zero. Classical
theory is explained here by saying that it would be true if n were
equal to zero; but it is false because �, as a universal physical
constant, has an exact, experimentally determinable non-zero value.
This "explanation" of classical theory by quantum mechanics is of some
significance because it does show that an intimate conceptual
connection exists between the two theories. However, letting h � 0,
while enlightening vis-a-vis relations between physically possible
worlds, says nothing as to the applicability of classical mechanics
to the actual world where quantum theory is the true theory. Something
must be said of this applicability if an explanation that satisfies the
first nonformal condition on reduction is to be forthcoming.
To be assured that the explanatory condition is satisfied, one
must consider what it means to say that quantum theory is the correct
fine-grain theory of the phase plane and state a condition under which
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classical theory, the coarse-grain theory, would be applicable.
Suppose one has a measuring instrument on the phase plane and suppose
that one attempts to make simultaneous measurements of position and
momentum with this device. The results of a series of measurements
on similarly prepared systems would be represented by a Liouville
density on the phase plane that covers an area of the plane. As
measurements are made more and more precisely, the area covered
becomes smaller and smaller. According to classical theory, there
is no limit as to how small this area might become. Indeed, on the
classical theory it can shrink to a point, in which case one has a
classical pure state.
Quantum theory implies that there are no classical pure states
and a fortiori implies that there is a limit to how small the area of
the phase plane under the Liouville density can become: The area under
the Liouville density can be no smaller than h. Hence, a Liouville
density which is the image of a quantum mechanical pure state must at
least cover an area of the phase plane of order h. Quantum mechanics,
as the correct fine-grain theory of the phase plane, tells us that we
can only look at areas of the phase plane larger than h. One would
expect classical mechanics, as a coarse-grain theory of the phase
plane, to provide a good approximation for the situations in which an
area considerably larger than h is scrutinized, that is, in those
situations in which we are far from a quantum mechanical pure state.
These reflections on what fine-grain and coarse-grain
theories of the phase plane provide lead to a criterion whereby one
can judge where classical mechanics might be applicable. It was shown























Its maximum value is of order l/Tr. This is true for the classical
image of any quantum mechanical pure state. As a coarse-grain theory,
classical mechanics is applicable in situations far from a quantum
mechanical pure state. So one can say that classical mechanics is
applicable in those situations in which the maximum value of �(q,p)
is much less than lin, or
Max[�(q,p)] « l/�.
This criterion states the limit of the validity of the classical
approximation. It states a condition for the applicability of the
fine and coarse-grain theories of the phase plane.
The criterion reveals another relationship between quantum
and classical theory other than the conceptual relationship as Tr � O.
By dint of the connection between pure states and measurement the
metaphor of fine and coarse-grain can be extended to the measuring
instruments themselves. This makes it possible to say something
about the use of classical mechanics in this world.
A fine-grain theory requires tt�asurements of high resolution,
a coarse-grain theory employs low resolution measurements. Hence, if
the resolving power of the measuring devices used in a given situation
is relatively low, only imprecise measurements are possible. In such
a situation the coarse-grain theory, classical mechanics, would appear
to be correct. It would appear to be correct in that low resolution
observation of the phase plane would yield no data that would be
inconsistent with classical theory. At a time when only low resolution
observation was possible, the success of classical mechanics might
encourage the belief that a state could be given an ideal representation
by a point on the phase plane. Even after the advent of high resolution
instruments, there would still be situations in which low resolution
measurements would be adequate for the practical specification of a
state (e.g., macroscopic systems). In other words, a quantum mechanical
state would be indistinguishable from a phase point where the precision
of the measurements is significantly less than the precision allowed by
the maximal measurements of quantum theory.
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On the basis of these considerations an account or explanation
of classical theory is forthcoming that satisfies the first nonformal
condition on reduction. If quantum mechanics is a true universal
theory, then classical mechanics is an approximation that would hold
only (i) if tt were equal to zero; or (ii) if relatively imprecise
measurements were used to specify the states of the system. Classical
mechanics fails as a universal theory because Planck's constant is not
equal to zero, because precise measurements are possible, and because
there are no classical pure states. The precision assumed by classical
theory is unrealistic and unattainable.
Condition (ii) above is the facet of the explanation generated
by the reduction which ensures the fulfillment of the explanatory
condition. A reliance on low resolution observations explains the
apparent success of classical theory, why it appears to work for
macroscopic systems and why a false theory appeared to work for so
many cases. This relation between the theories shows how the classical
picture is incorporated into the quantum picture and shows how confir­
matory relations of evidential support are established between the
theories. It is also (ii) that explains the success and justifies the
use of classical approximation techniques.
The intertheoretic explanation given of classical mechanics
by quantum mechanics differs somewhat from the typical examples of
limiting case reductions. First of all, it has been shown that one
can consider a limiting case by literally letting tt � 0 [(i) above]
or limiting cases where the tt dependence is negligible [(ii) above].
It is typically the latter case that is discussed in the literature.
As shown, such discussions validate the use of classical mechanics as
an approximation under certain experimental conditions or for certain
systems. This is the usual type of explanation given in limiting case
reductions. For example, in the explanation of the ideal gas law by
the van der Waals law, the van der Waals law states the following
relation among volume, pressure, and temperature.
(V - b)(P +�) = RT
V2
where R is the universal gas constant, b a constant characteristic of
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the substance depending on the molecular diameter and the number of
molecules present, and � another constant characteristic of the system.
Where a and b are small, that is as �, l + 0, the van der Waals law
becomes
PV = RT
the ideal gas law. Because � and l are system dependent, this limiting
case argument explains the apparent success of the ideal law and
justifies its use as an approximation for certain systems. Similarly,





R2 (1 + h/R) 2
where G is the gravitational constant, m the mass of the body, M the
mass of the Earth, R the radius of the Ear th , and h the height of the
body above the surface of the Earth. As h/R goes to zero
or the acceleration of a body falling near the surface of the Earth is
constant, which is Galileo's law. This limiting case argument justifies
Galileo's law as an approximation valid for bodies very close to the
Earth's surface. In both of these paradigmatic cases, an explanation
is given of why the secondary theory might appear to be sufcessful in
some cases and not in others.
For the quantum mechanical case, in addition to this usual type
of explanation, an explanation was also forthcoming where one let
n + ° and where this limit could be approached in a mathematically
rigorous manner. This formal result generates an explanation of classical
theory in terms of a relation between physically possible worlds,
emphasizing the conceptual connection between the two theories. The
present result suggests that two types of intertheoretic explanation
might be possible in limiting case reductions, one where the limit is
taken with respect to a system specific parameter of function and one
where the limit is taken with respect to a universal physical constant.
In the former case empirical connections are established between the
theories; in the latter case conceptual connections are established
between the theories.
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It should be mentioned here that a given limiting case reduction
might not always fall entirely under one or the other of these two
types of intertheoretic explanation. The example of Galileo's law and
the quantum mechanical cases under (ii) above are clearly limits with
respect to system specific parameters or functions. The van der Waals
case, where the constants �, l � 0, is usually interpreted as
establishing empirical connections between the two laws, justifying
the applicability of the ideal law under certain conditions. However,
the constants � and�, even though they refer to system specific
properties of molecular diameter and intermolecular attraction, do
characterize actual properties of gas molecules. One could as well
interpret �, �, � 0 as envisioning a possible world where the molecules
were ideal mass points with no forces of intermolecular attraction.
Under such an interpretation, an explanation emphasizing the conceptual
connections between the two gas laws might be forthcoming.
The explanation given to classical mechanics in the present
reduction also differs from the typical examples in being extremely
abstract. Quantum theory and classical theory are compared and con­
trasted as theories of the phase plane, where this is a mathematical
construct invented to facilitate the description of mechanical systems.
On the formulation of intertheoretic explanation adopted, the
explanation consists of contrasting conditions that do obtain with the
conditions under which the secondary theory would be true, where these
conditions can be cited as causes for the success of the primary
theory and the failure of the secondary theory. The abstractness of
the proffered explanation of classical mechanics might be criticized
as being no "causal" explanation at all.
Explanations of the ideal gas law or of phenomenological
thermodynamics are more concrete, or at least more readily visualizable.
For the gas laws one imagines that �, k � O. These constants are
dependent upon molecular diameters and the density of the gas. By
considering limits on these constants, one is contrasting the van der
Waals assumption of molecules as hard spheres subject to forces of
intermolecular attraction with the ideal law assumption of molecules
as point masses subject to no intermolecular forces. There is a
visualizable picture at hand in terms of which it is possible to see
exactly what the ideal law left out and to envisage situations in
50
which that oversight is insignificant, namely, for dilute gases.
Similarly, statistical mechanics as a theory of the behavior of large
numbers of particles explains the gross thermodynamical properties of
matter by showing how systems of particles produce the gross effects.
The formal aspect of this reduction leads to an account of how
collisions of the particles on a container wall can be associated
with the pressure of the gas in the container. In both of these
cases, there is available an acceptable visualizable model for both
the primary and secondary theory which facilitates the understanding
of what causal conditions must be varied or ignored to formulate an
adequate explanation.
The explanation of classical mechanics by quantum mechanics
might be criticized as being too abstract or may not seem to be as
compelling as the explanation in the above examples. These qualms
stem from the fact that there is no visualizable model available for
quantum theory in its usual formulation. However, such criticisms
are misguided. The Wigner transformation yields a phase plane version
of quantum theory. As long .as the problem of the interpretation of
the classical formalism is deemed solved by appeal to the phase
plane model, the present reduction does employ as adequate an inter­
pretation of the quantum formalism as is possible at present. This
reduction fulfills the requirements for a significant reduction by
making full use of the developed formalisms of each theory to generate
a picture of the two theories. That this picture must be formulated
within an abstract, mathematical space is no impediment to the
adequacy of the reduction, given the role of that space in the inter­
pretation of classical theory and the epistemological accessability
of that interpretation.
The second nonformal condition on an adequate reduction, the
unity condition, states that the reduction must result in the unifi­
cation of physical theory. Fulfillment of this condition guarantees
that the primary theory is superior to the secondary theory in its
range of explanatory power and in its theoretical economy. This
superiority is manifested (i) by the primary theory being able to
account for a significant portion of the phenomena, and in ideal cases
all of the phenomena, explained by the secondary theory and (ii) by
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the primary theory being able to justify some of independent primitive
assumptions of the secondary theory. (It is necessary to distinguish
the ideal case from the general case because there are instances where
one wants to claim that a reduction does unify physical theory, but
where the primary theory cannot, in its current formulation, give a
completely adequate account of all the phenomena explained by the
secondary theory. Quantum mechanics is one such case. Quantum
mechanics reduces to classical mechanics and, as will be shown, unifies
physical theory; yet, there is at present no adequate quantum theory
of gravity). Where the primary and secondary theories treat of
apparently distinct phenomena, this particular aspect of reduction is
most noticeable and significant.
Again, the reduction of statistical mechanics to thermodynamics
affords a prime example of how reduction can unify physical theory.
Thermodynamics was a well-confirmed theory, describing relations between
certain gross properties of systems such as temperature, pressure, and
entropy. Another extremely successful theory emerged, the atomic
theory of matter, which implied that all matter is composed of small
particles which obey certain physical laws. The conceptual problem
was that these two successful theories appeared to be independent of
each other, where one would expect that if the atomic theory of matter
is correct, the gross properties of material systems should be
explicable in terms of their constituent particles. The successful
reduction did show that the thermodynamical properties of matter could
be explained in terms of the constituent particles. Where previously
there were two sets of laws explaining two independent sets of
phenomena, the reduction shows that one set of laws will suffice and
that the previously independent sets of phenomena are indeed xeLated ,
That greater theoretical economy should also be expected from the
reduction is made a condition on its success by Khinchin:
••• statistical mechanics considers every kind of
matter as a certain mechanical svstem an4 tries to
deduce the genel:.al. physIcal (in particular, thermo­
dynamical) laws governing the behavior of this
matter from the most general properties of
mechanical systems, and � ipso to eliminate from
the corresponding parts of physics any theoreti­
cally unjustified postulation of their funda­
mental laws (Khinchin 1949:7).
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Thus, in this reduction both the second law of thermodynamics and the
ideal gas law can be derived from statistical mechanics, whereas in
classical thermodynamics these laws are stated as independent primitive
assumptions. Statistical mechanics unifies physical theory because
it not only accounts for the data of classical thermodynamics, it
also explains and justifies primitive assumptions of that theory (cf.
Friedman 1974).
The reduction of statistical mechanics to thermodynamics is an
example of a heterogeneous reduction--a reduction wherein the domains
of the primary and secondary theory are distinct. And it is with this
type of reduction that the unification of physical theory is most
dramatic. Where the primary and secondary theories are two different
theories of the same set of phenomena, a homogeneous reduction,
reduction is often viewed as only a formal problem of relating the
structures of the two theories. The case of the reduction of quantum
mechanics to classical mechanics is clearly a case of homogeneous
reduction, if for no other reason than that both theories were believed
to be universally applicable. This being the prevailing belief, there
is no possibility of viewing the theories as treating of distinct,
independent domains. Even so, significant unification of physical
theory results from this reduction.
The reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics unifies
physical theory by explaining or justifying some of the independent
primitive assumptions of classical theory. In particular, the
reduction explains or justifies the laws of conservation of linear
momentum, angular momentum, and energy.
Newton's great achievement was the discovery of his dynamical
law. This law, as the second law of motion, is the principle postulate
of Newtonian mechanics. However, given the second law and the
assumption of Galilean invariance the laws of conservation of linear
and angular momentum, which are equivalent to Newton's third law,
cannot be deduced; and given these laws the conservation of energy
cannot be derived. The classical conservation laws can be derived
using the second law and the additional assumption that the forces
involved can be derived from a potential depending only on the
distances between the particles. Mach's derivation of these laws
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requires two additional assumptions: That the force on any particle
can be resolved into a sum of forces each due to another particle and
that such forces depend only on the positions, and not on the
velocities of the interacting pair (Mach 1893:376). There are then
two alternatives open to us in Newtonian mechanics. Either the
second law and the conservation laws must be assumed as primitive
postulates of a somewhat arbitrary kind, or additional special
assumptions must be made which allow the derivation of the conser­
vation laws from Newton's second law.
Newton did advance an argument for the third law from the first
law (cf. Home 1968:43). He gave a reductio ad absurdam for the third
law based on the following thought experiment: Imagine an obstacle
placed between two attracting bodies. If one body experiences a
stronger attraction than the other, the pressure of this body on the
obstacle will overcome the pressure of the other body on the obstacle
causing the system to accelerate to infinity. But such a circumstance
is impossible by the first law. This argument, however, would also
appear to make use of Mach's first assumption that the force on any
particle can be resolved into a sum of forces each due to another
particle. In this case, the force on the obstacle is resolved into
a sum of forces due to the two attracting bodies.
For quantum mechanics the situation is much simpler. The
conservation laws follow directly from quantum kinematics and the
assumption of Galilean invariance without appeal to any dynamical law.
The one assumption required for the derivations is von Neumann's
postulate that states are represented by vectors in an abstract
Hilbert space and that physical quantities are represented by self­
adjoint operators on these vectors. Suppose that in the Schrodinger
picture the time development of the expectation value of an op�rator
A is calculated
iiT ddt (lj), Alj) = (lj), AUt�) - (ih ll, A\jJ) + (\jJ iiT aA ",)ot at 'at If'
(lj), AHlj) - (\jJ, HA\jJ) + iiT (\jJ, �� \jJ)
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where H is the Hamiltonian operator for the system. Where A does not




= (�, AH-HA �).
If A commutes with the Hamiltonian, AH = HA, then the time
development of the expectation value of A is zero, and A is a quantum
mechanical constant of the motion or a conserved quantity. If A is a
generator of the Galilean group, say the total momentum operator P,
then by the assumption of invariance
PH� = HP�
for all states�. P commutes with H and is a conserved quantity,
which is to say that linear momentum is conserved. Analogous arguments
establish the conservation of angular momentum, and for energy the
result is immediate, as A = H and H2_H2 = o.
Quantum mechanically, a quantity is conserved if its operator
commutes with the Hamiltonian operator, that is if its commutator with
H is zero. According to Proposition 2 of the preceding chapter in the




(AH - HA) = {A, H} .tt
But if the Poisson bracket of a classical quantity and the classical
Hamiltonian is zero, then, according to classical theory, that quantity
is conserved; hence, under the Wigner transformation in the limit
n � 0, the quantum mechanical conservation laws yield the conservation
laws for the corresponding classical quantities.
This is not a new result, indeed it is widely accepted that "the
simplest proof of the conservation laws in classical theory is based
on the remark that classical theory is a limiting case of quantum
theory" (Wigner 1967:20). But this simple proof of the classical
conservation laws requires considering the behavior of the quantum
equations as tt � 0. To the extent that this limiting relation is
imprecise, the proofs are imprecise. Exhibiting the limiting relation
in a rigorous manner by means of the Wigner transformation removes this
imprecision. Furthermore, the Wigner transformation is the reduction
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function for the reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics,
so these proofs show that the reduction unifies physical theory. By
means of the reduction, the classical conservation laws need not be
assumed as postulates nor need they rely on additional ad hoc assumptions
for their derivation. Quantum mechanics explains and justifies these
primitive assumptions of classical theory and consequently the reduction
satisfies the second nonformal condition on reductions.
Although the reduction satisfies all of the proposed conditions
on an adequate reduction and it can be claimed that quantum mechanics
does explain classical mechanics, there is another facet to the
relation between the theories which has not yet been addressed. A
compelling motive for the sustained research, by both philosophers
and physicists, into the foundations of quantum mechanics is the
presence of formidable problems of theoretical interpretation. The
preceding discussions of the relation of quantum theory to classical
theory assumed that the quantum theory is suitably interpreted by
associating elements of the algebra AQ with the states and observables
of mechanical systems. The mathematical formalism when interpreted in
this way is extremely successful over a wide range of phenomena. In
the discussion of the first nonforma1 condition, the maximal measure­
ments of the two theories were easily compared and contrasted. The
fulfillment of the first condition was defended from various criticisms
on the ground that quantum mechanics is as adequately interpreted as is
classical mechanics in terms of the phase plane model. From this point
of view, quantum theory is as adequately interpreted as any other
theory of mathematical physics. However, this interpretation of the
quantum formalism which allows for its successful experimental appli­
cation solves the interpretative problem of quantum mechanics only in
what Howard Stein calls the epistemological sense (Stein 1972:369).
What remains problematic is an adequate metaphysical or ontological
interpretation of the theory. The difficulty is that certain conceptual
questions arise out of the formalism that admit no easy answer. Lacking
such answers, it is extremely difficult to say what is really going on
in the world as it is described by quantum theory. Can the reduction
of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics aid in answering these
questions?
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It is a testimony to the clarity and precision of the quantum
formalism that these conceptual problems can be given a rigorous
formulation. The root of the metaphysical problem of interpretation
is that what appears to be the case when the theory is applied to
specific atomic systems is demonstrably inconsistent with the formalism
of the theory. In particular, every time a dynamical quantity of an
elementary particle is measured a reasonably precise value is ascer­
tained for that quantity. Thus, measurements would lead one to believe
that for any atomic system each dynamical quantity has, at all times, a
precise value. But although the evidence suggests the general hypothesis
that all dynamical quantities have precise simultaneous values, the
existence of precise simultaneous values is inconsistent with the
formalism of quantum mechanics. The inconsistency of what is observed
with the formal theory follows from a corollary of Gleason's theorem:
If the dimensionality of the state space is greater than two, the
additivity requirement for expectation values of commuting operators
cannot be met by dispersion free states (cf. Bell 1966). This corollary
treats of the case of an infinite number of operators. The proof of
Kochen and Specker (1967) establishes a similar result for the case of
a finite number of operators, and it is this proof that will be
discussed here.
Proofs such as that of Kochen and Specker are quite sophisti­
cated mathematically and are the subject of considerable current
research in their own right; but for the purpose of investigating the
relation between reduction and the metaphysical problem of interpre­
tation, it suffices to consider simply the structure and basic
assumptions of these proofs. Results like the corollary to Gleason's
Theorem are usually invoked to show that it is impossible to construct
a hidden variable interpretation of quantum theory. In a hidden
variable interpretation, a phase space of hidden states, having the
same formal structure as the phase space of classical statistical
mechanics, is posited. The quantum theory is then interpreted by
defining a mapping, w, which takes the quantum states to the phase
space of the hidden states. The mapping w must satisfy two conditions.
First of all it is required that the mapping be such that the
expectation value of the quantum observable A in the state p be giYen
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by phase-space averaging of the image of p and A
Tr(pA) = b �(w)A(w)dw.
This is to say that in the hidden variable theory expectation values
(1)
are to be calculated by the classical prescription. Kochen and Specker
show that this requirement can be trivially satisfied, but satisfied
in such a way that observables become independent random variables
over the phase space of hidden states. However, the observab1es of a
theory are not all independent of one another; indeed, some observables
are functions of others. This being the case, observables have an
algebraic structure. Kochen and Specker make it a second condition
on w that it preserve this structure. This second condition on w can
be formulated
A � A =7f(A) � f(A) (2)
where w maps quantum operators into real valued functions on the space
of hidden states and where f is any function of A.
In terms of conditions (1) and (2), Kochen and Specker formulate
a precise necessary condition for the existence of hidden variables:
If a hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible
then there must be an embedding, w, of the noncommutative algebra of
quantum mechanics into a commutative algebra. Kochen and Specker
formulate this condition in terms of the partial algebra of quantum
observab1es. However, the notion of a partial algebra is introduced
solely for the purpose of making condition (2) more tractable (cf.
Kochen and Specker 1967:64). In the present context this complication
can be avoided, as the introduction of partial algebras is not crucial
to the strategy or general assumptions of the proof. Kochen and
Specker proceed to prove that no such embedding w can exist. The
proof consists of showing that (2) is inconsistent with another general
constraint on the structure of quantum theory, the additivity requirement:
w '" w '" w '" '"
A -+ A and B -+ B � A + B -+ A + B. (3)
This condition must be satisfied if it is to be maintained that for
all quantum states the expectation value of a sum of operators is the
sum of the expectation values. Quite simply then, the strategy of the
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proof is to show that the existence of the algebra homomorphism required
by (2) is inconsistent with the additivity requirement (3).
Note that this is a very strong result. It establishes that
there can be no homomorphism from the noncommutative algebra of
quantum observables, �, into any commutative algebra whatsoever; a
fortiori there can be no homomorphism from � to)b. Hidden variable
interpretations of quantum theory, the existence of dispersion free
measures (a probability measure is dispersion free if and only if it
assigns Oor I to each indempotent of �), and truth value assignments
to quantum mechanical propositions are likewise all shown to be
impossible as they require the existence of a homomorphism from � to
a commutative algebra.
A further consequence of the Kochen-Specker result is that
precise simultaneous values of all dynamical observables cannot exist.
For suppose that every observable has a precise value at a given time.
Then there must exist a real valued function w which maps each operator
A into the value that it has at that time. If it is required for any
function f(A) that
w[f(A)] = f[w(A)]
then w must be a homomorphism from the noncommutative algebra of
quantum observables �Q into the commutative algebra of real numbers.
By the Kochen-Specker result no such w can exist. Therefore, precise
simultaneous values of all observables cannot exist.
In this way the Kochen-Specker result throws the conceptual
difficulties of a metaphysically adequate interpretation of quantum
theory into sharp relief. On our best interpretation of that theory,
whenever the theory is used and measurements are made, it appears as
if all dynamical quantities have precise simultaneous values; yet the
existence of such values is inconsistent with the quantum formalism.
The Wigner transformation maps quantum mechanics onto the
classical phase plane. It might be thought that the reduction
achieved by means of this transformation could aid in resolving the
conceptual problems surrounding the quantum theory.
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W is a one-to-one, and hence invertible, mapping of �Q into �c.
The Wigner transformation was originally proposed as a means for
computing quantum mechanical expectation values by the method of
classical statistical mechanics. So at least in some instances W
satisfies (1). However, W does not satisfy (2) and hence it is not
a homomorphism of a noncommuting algebra of Hermitian operators into
a commuting algebra. A simple counter-example suffices to show that
(2) is violated. Consider the case of the linear harmonic oscillator
and let ft be its classical Hamiltonian. Then







= W-l(H2) = iah QP + ah2
m 2m
that is, W-l(H2) � [W-l(H)]2; so W, W-l are not homomorphisms and (2)
is not satisfied.
According to Proposition 1, the basic result of the reduction,
there is a mutual embedding of the commutative algebra of classical
mechanics into the noncommutative algebra of quantum mechanics in the
limit as tt � O. Also, in this limit (5) equals (6) in the above
counter-example. Thus, if * has any non-zero value, W does not
satisfy the conditions placed by Kochen and Specker on an embedding
from a noncommutative algebra into a commutative algebra. Where tt � 0
and W is used to map AQ into �c all of the negative results of the
Kochen and Specker proof stand, and precise simultaneous values are
impossible. Because the conceptual problems of an adequate meta­
physical interpretation of quantum theory can be formulated in terms
of the existence of precise simultaneous values, the Wigner transfor­
mation and the associated reduction of quantum mechanics to classical
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statistical mechanics do not aid in solving these conceptual problems.
As n � 0, W becomes a homomorphic mapping of quantum theory into
classical theory. Whereas W does not sanction the reduction of a
theory of classical structure to quantum theory, as the hidden variable
theorists desire, it does yield a reduction of quantum mechanics to
classical mechanics as n � o.
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SUMMARy
At the outset of this essay, two questions were posed: In what
sense, if any, is classical mechanics a limiting case of quantum
mechanics? What does it mean to say that one theory is a limiting
case of another? After reviewing the orthodox and heterodox answers
to these questions, it was concluded that the orthodox position would
be tenable only if classical mechanics were a bona fide mathematical
limit of quantum mechanics as n + 0 and only if the orthodox view of
intertheoretic explanation could be broadened to allow intertheoretic
explanation where the secondary theory was not strictly derivable from
the primary theory. This broadened outlook requires that an adequate
reduction satisfy both formal and nonformal conditions.
In Chapter II the formal conditions on an adequate reduction of
quantum mechanics to classical mechanics were discussed. A detour
through abstract mechanics motivated the claim that, formally, an
adequate reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics requires
the existence of a structure preserving mapping, or reduction function,
from the quantum algebra of observab1es, �Q' to the classical algebra
of observables, �c' and from the Lie algebra of quantum theory, -<Q,
to the Lie algebra of classical mechanics,�, in the limit as n + O.c
The Wigner transformation, W, was shown to be a natural reduction
function. Three propositions were proved shOWing that W satisfies
the formal conditions on an adequate reduction of quantum theory to
classical theory as n + O.
Nonformal conditions on the reduction were discussed in Chapter
III. The pragmatic and epistemic facets of explanation require that a
reduction, as a species of explanation, satisfy an explanatory condition
and a unity condition in addition to the formal conditions presented
in Chapter II. The Wigner transformation as a reduction function
generated a reduction of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics
which satisfies the explanatory and unity conditions. The explanations
of classical theory by quantum theory resulting from this reduction
were compared and contrasted with other examples of intertheoretica1
explanation.
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An additional topic was treated in Chapter III. The problem of
formulating an adequate metaphysical interpretation of quantum theory
was presented and made precise in terms of the Kochen-Specker result.
Where n � 0 and W is used to map �Q into �c' the negative results of
Kochen-Specker stand and W provides no obvious solution to the meta­
physical problems of interpretation.
On the basis of these arguments, it can be concluded that
classical mechanics is a strict limiting case of quantum mechanics
as n� 0 and that if one theory is to be a limiting case of another,
certain formal and nonformal conditions must be stated and satisfied.
These conclusions support the orthodox physical and philosophical
positions.
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APPENDIX: THE IMAGE OF HARMONIC OSCILLATOR PURE STATES UNDER W
In the position representation, the normalized pure states of






where H (q//h) is the nth Hermite polynomial. The von Neumann densityn
corresponding to this wave function is
For products of Hermite polynomials the following generating function
obtains (Morse and Feshbach 1953:786)
_(x2+y2_2xyz/1-z2) 2 2 00
_e = e-x -y L
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[_z_] H (x) H (y).
2n, n nn.
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Multiplying both sides of this expression by e and simplifying
the left-hand side yields
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The Wigner transformation is
1 f ipa aft ahWp(q,q') ="2; da e [q -2' q +2] •
The Wigner transformation is linear, so it can be applied to (1).
Letting x = (2q-ah)/2� and y = (2q+ah)/2/h in (1), one gets
1 1 _(q2/h) (l-Z)/(l+z)j d ipa -(fta2/4) (l+z)/(l-z)e a e e =21T �
/l+z�
t n 2 2
L [_z__] 1 da eipa e-q /ft e--fta /4 H [2q-ah]H [2q+ah]n=Q 2nn! n 2vh n 2&
*
Note that here 9 is the 9/b of p. 42 and p is the bp of p. 42.
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The left hand integral can be evaluated by completing the square:
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1 1 /I=Z _[(q2+p2)/�] (1-z)/(1+z) •
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.r; At /1+z2 11+z
In this expression, let t/1-t = (l-z)/(l+z); that is, let z = 1-2t.
On making this substitution and simplifying, the resulting expression
one finds that
1 1 /I=Z _[(q2+p2)/�] (l-z)/(l+z)-_ e
.r; .,4; 11+z2 Il+z
2 2
= _1_.L J# e-[ (q +p ) /�] t/1-t
2/; vh t+1 1 - t
2 2
1 1 I2t 00 n Ln [(q +p ) /�]
=
2/; �v' �1 n�o t n!
Hence, the result of applying the Wigner transformation to the generating
function for products of Hermite polynomials is the generating function





Quantum mechanical pure states for the harmonical oscillator are mapped
to Laguerre functions in the action variable on the classical phase plane.
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